Over the last two decades, Hindutva, characterised by an aggressive, communal and authoritarian streak, has etched out an influential place for itself in Indian politics. Venomous campaigns against the minorities and an equally vituperative propaganda against secular and plural values have marked this forward march of Hindutva. It would be misleading to see this forward drive as a spontaneous mass outburst against a secular-democratic set up and for religio-cultural nationalism. To identify it so ‘suppresses a whole history of meticulously organized efforts towards a Hindu Rashtra’ (Basu et al: 1). Rather than being a sudden upsurge, the spread of ideas represented by Hindutva is attributable to gradual and meticulous mobilisational work combining multiple strategies that are alert to contextual and social differences.
Present day Hindutva, both as a movement and as an idea, has a past that goes back to the colonial period. As a political movement its history can be traced back to the early 20th century, to the founding of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). As an idea, it can be traced to the 19th century writings of influential icons of the socio-religious reform and national movements like Vivekananda, Tilak and Savarkar among others. But it was the RSS which made Hindutva a mass phenomenon in the post-independence period. Hindutva’s present spread has been the result of years of meticulous planning, organisation and mobilisational activism of the RSS. A lot of work has gone into broadening Hindutva’s mass appeal and this essay attempts to study this ‘hard work’.
The RSS and Its Offshoots
Floating of front organisations was one of the important ways of ideological expansion undertaken by the RSS. Accordingly, the Rashtra Sevika Samiti (1936), Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (1948), the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (1951, which subsequently became the BJP), the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (1955), the Vishva Hindu Parishad (1964), the Bajrang Dal (1980s), etc were floated. Launching of these organisations was an effective way of mass work and ideological dissemination.
These organisations work in tandem with each other, but have their own specific purpose to fulfil. For instance, the Rashtra Sevika Samiti was floated to work among women. The ABVP was set up to contain the influence of communism in college campuses and develop cadre for the RSS. The labour unit was also floated to contain the influence of communist trade unions among industrial labour. The VHP was set up to handle mass mobilisational work and to organise the ‘Hindu’ diaspora. A political party was indispensable to politically fortify Hindutva in state institutions and hence, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh became the electoral front. In 1980, after the debacle of the post-Emergency coalition, it was re-incarnated as the Bharatiya Janata Party. The Bajrang Dal was formed in the early 1980s to organise the youth for the Ramjanmabhoomi agitation.
The membership of these organisations is floating, that is, their members move with ease between these organisations. For instance, a member of the RSS can be a member of the VHP as also that of the BJP. The only exception is that women members cannot be part of the RSS, whose membership is restricted to men. These organisations work under the aegis of their parent – the RSS – mobilising popular opinion in the name of Hindu religion.
The RSS, on its part, calls itself a cultural organisation engaged in character building and preparing volunteers in service of the Hindu nation.[1] These organisations collectively are known as the Sangh Parivar and they articulate a right wing Hindu supremacist ideology called Hindutva, which has found resonance among large sections of the citizenry at a time when the economic and social relations are experiencing major shifts. India’s body politic is seeing a shift from a one party dominant system to a coalitional set up. There are not only different parties in power at the centre and the states, but also a singular set up at the level of the central government is absent. It has become imperative for parties representing varied interests and regions to come together to run governments in the absence of an absolute majority for any single political party in Parliament. This is also a time when the Indian state is in retreat trying to move from the welfarist position it had adopted after independence to a minimalist position. It is a period when developments like globalisation are opening the domestic economy to uncertainities brought upon by the ups and downs of global trade and pricing coupled with the harsh stance taken by the world financial institutions in favour of removing the few welfare nets provided by the State. In this backdrop, Hindutva has found acceptance among large sections of the middle and the working classes, and among both the upper and the disadvantaged castes.
Interpretation of History
Communalism interprets history in a particular way so as to advance communal politics. For communalism, religious prejudice rather than an objective view of history forms the basis of historical analysis. Here, religion and religious conflict are given a centrality and their role exaggerated to such an extent that even simple rivalries over secular issues are seen through a religious-sectarian prism. The religious communities are considered primary historical agents and are perceived as internally undifferentiated. Historical narratives and memories of communities, perceived thus, are prone to distortions and de-contextualisations. It is possible to assert that Hindutva’s historical memory consists of deliberate picking and choosing of facts and peddling of half-truths to fit their world view. Such a communal interpretation is used as a ‘powerful ideology for creating communal solidarity’ (Panikkar 1991: 2).
This sectarian vision of the past legitimises Hindu communalism by laying maximum claims on Indian antiquity (Thapar 1991: 5). This interpretation of history politically fortifies Hindutva by equalling Indian history with Hindu history. The Hindu religion and Hindu community are depicted as going back to the earliest times (Panikkar: 2). An ancient cohesiveness is attributed to them which is then paraded as superior status and an exclusive claim over Indian territory. India becomes a land of the Hindus who then acquire exclusive claim over rights of citizenship. The Hindus, according to this interpretation, become an ancient cohesive race and original inhabitants of India. Conversely, the Muslims and Christians become outsiders or foreigners.
Indian history is divided into historical periods based on the religion of the rulers. It is a history, which does not take into account the complex currents and cross-currents that make up the historical process. This periodisation of history – Hindu, Muslim and British – is borrowed from James Mill’s, History of British India.[2] It depicts ancient India as Hindu, medieval India as Muslim and colonial India as British. Besides, officially endorsing and exaggerating the Hindu-Muslim antagonism, this British periodisation creates monoliths out of religious communities giving them a nonexistent cohesiveness.
The votaries of Hindutva use the insider-outsider stereotype repeatedly for Hindus and the minority communities, respectively. This binary is then extended in branding the Hindus as members of the nation and the Muslims/Christians as excluded from this nation. The ‘Hindu’ becomes ‘Indian’ and vice versa. The religious minorities are also given stereotypes of voracious proselytisers, fanatics, violent and as having extra-territorial loyalties. Hindutva propaganda specifically targets Muslim men, who are accused of marrying four times, having innumerable children as well as abducting and forcibly marrying Hindu girls all for the evil purpose of overtaking the Hindu population of India.
History is used to build such stereotypes and consequently generate hatred for and fear of minorities in present times precisely because such a demographic threat is non-existent.
Simplicity of Message and Careful Selection of Cultural Symbols
It is noteworthy that though the Sangh Parivar uses religion for political mobilisation, there is no scriptural mastery needed to comprehend its worldview. Even the Sangh Parivar programmes are so planned as to generate an enthusiastic and unhesitant participation. One of the reasons that its appeal becomes attractive is ‘the basic simplicity of its ideological message, preached in a style that deliberately avoids complexities and debates..’(Basu et al: 36). An analytical or a critical faculty is not a requirement for imbibing its message. Simplicity is a strategy used by the Sangh Parivar to take forward Hindutva, which includes a careful selection of cultural symbols. The symbols and icons picked up are not only objects of reverence but are also characterised by an easy recognisability. They are devotional rallying points possessing local sacred status with legends and folklore attached to them. Also, they have acceptability across regional and caste boundaries. This makes them potent in the hands of those wanting to deploy them for political mobilisation. Myths built around these symbols are communally enveloped before dissemination. Gaumata, Gangamata, Bharatmata, Rama, Krishna and Shiva are some of the symbols used by the Sangh Parivar for mobilising the masses. These Hindu symbols and myths when combined with communal messages have socially damaging implications. But this is how communal hatred is generated and Hindutva strengthens its hold.
Gaumata, or mother cow, a Hindu symbol signifying nurture, generosity, care and prosperity became a rallying symbol of the cow-protection agitation of 1966 led by the Jana Sangh along with the Hindu Mahasabha and the Arya Samaj. The immediate result of this cow-agitation, which had a strong political content, was that the Jana Sangh reaped a rich political harvest in the general elections that followed, especially in the northern Hindi-speaking states. It more than doubled its strength in the Lok Sabha from 14 seats in the 1962 elections to 35 seats in 1967. A significant feature of this agitation was an active participation of spear and trident carrying sadhus, whose tactical involvement in the subsequent mass programmes of the Sangh Parivar has been politically gainful. The cow-protection agitation was of importance for building support for the Jana Sangh among socially orthodox Hindus in north India.[3]
The three symbols – Bharatmata (portrayed as a Hindu goddess often as an incarnation of Durga/Kali, the symbol of sakti), Gangamata (the river Ganges) and to some extent Gaumata – were used extensively during the ekatmata yatra programme in 1983. They became the three mother symbols on which this organised mass campaign was built by the RSS through one of its offshoots, the VHP. Through the month long yatras criss-crossing the country, undertaken ostensibly for the unity of the country, the Sangh Parivar aimed to broaden its social base and brush off the urban-upper caste label attached to it. The three mother symbols were used as symbols of Hindu unity, in other words, national unity, thus, meaningfully fusing ‘the Hindu’ with ‘the national’. The yatras aimed to popularise the idea of a united Hindu society in the wake of regional secessionist movements and the Dalit assertions.
The yatras did work out well in using religious sentiments for large-scale mobilisation. Popular devotional participation occurred in an ostensibly religious event suffused with political messages. The yatras were met with a tremendous devotional response in course of their processional routes.[4]
Encouraged by the throbbing response to its ekatmata yatra programme the VHP-RSS from next year onwards (1984) launched the Ramjanmabhoomi ‘liberation’ campaign. The issue was communally sensitive – this was widely known. It had generated serious communal tension in the past, but it matched well with the sectarian goal of Hindu nationalism.
Rama, a revered Hindu deity of north India, was an important symbol of mobilisation. Some factors seem to have contributed to the VHP’s selection of Rama and to indicate that it was not a random choice. The dispute over Rama’s so called birthplace was already a local issue of considerable importance when the VHP took up Rama and the cause of ‘Ramjanma Bhoomi’s liberation’. Rama is a familiar name in India and he figures as one of the most important deities within popular Hindu traditions at the local level in north India. Rama and his exploits have been integrated into the myths and legends of people over a large part of India, except perhaps in some areas of the south. Local songs, stories and histories are replete with references to the life of Rama and every region in India has been touched by some episodes of the mythical Ramayana. Apart from the orthodox Hindu versions of Valmiki and Tulsidas, the various other living traditions of the Ramayana make Rama a widely known deity.
Another factor, which facilitated the VHP’s bond with Rama, is that in the mid-eighties there was a tremendous growth of tele-media in India, though under state control and supervision. In 1987-88 the serialised telecast of the Ramayana, on the national television network encouraged the VHP to accelerate its campaign for turning Rama into the supreme moral ideal for the Hindus. Rama was presented by the VHP as a rashtrapurusha and also a maryadapurshottam. The calmness or shanta rasa with which Rama is traditionally associated came to be replaced by an aggressive or ugra bhava (Kapur 1993: 85). Rama was transformed from a tranquil, tender figure to an interventionist warrior (Kapur 1992: 48).
The VHP itself admitted that Rama’s name is not only a symbol of devotion, but also of power; that it was the most potent and reliable way of galvanising and unifying the Hindus.[5] The consistent calls to ‘virility’ for the protection of the motherland by the VHP fitted perfectly its choice of Rama as a rashtrapurusha who could protect the holy and vulnerable Bharatmata from the ‘sinister’ Muslims, just as he saved his wife Sita from the Ravana. Every Hindu was called upon to be like Rama and protect Bharatmata. Mobilisations in the name of Rama by the VHP and the Sangh Parivar led to the demolition of the Babri mosque in December 1992. The BJP’s electoral successes in the late 1980s and early 1990s and its becoming a mainstream party have much to do with Ramjanmabhoomi agitations.
Added to this are the efforts of the VHP to make the Krishna temple at Mathura, the Kashi-Vishwanath temple at Varanasi and the Baba Budhan dargah, a sufi shrine in the Chikmagalur district of Karnataka, the rallying points of more communal upsurges for the advancement of Hindutva. The Sangh Parivar has been making attempts to whip up anti-Muslim passions through building communal propaganda about these sites.
Absence of a Strong Socio-Economic Agenda
Social conservatism and the economically modernist positions of the urban upper castes ensure support for Hindutva as it is an ideology that does not disturb the entrenched caste and class hierarchies. This non-subversiveness attracts to it the support of the upper castes among the middle class. What is significant is that Hindutva has a substantial following among the OBCs and it is growing among the Dalits. This is because, for the upwardly mobile sections, Hindutva brings hopes of social honour and political position to parallel their growing economic self-confidence.
However, the inherent proximity of Hindutva ideology to the established social hierarchies and positions of economic privilege make it difficult for the Sangh Parivar to articulate a socio-economic agenda which would mobilise the larger masses. Issues like land reforms, right to livelihoods, equitable distribution of resources and entitlements, right to education, health and gender equality, etc, lie outside the ‘core-competence’ of the Sangh Parivar.
In the absence of such issues, which can effectively mobilise the masses, the Sangh Parivar needs an agenda that can rally the masses in its support. This agenda is provided by raising religious issues which are part of the emotional baggage of the people, and are raised in a manner which is sectarian. These religious issues while sharpening the communal divide obfuscate the hierarchical lines of division inside the Hindu community and eclipse the existent social oppression. These issues become ideal tools for mass mobilisation as they galvanise the community behind the Parivar and help it to establish itself in power.
Themes such as ‘Hinduism in danger’, ‘unity and brotherhood of Hindus’, ‘liberation of Ramjanmabhoomi’, ‘minorities growing in numbers’, ‘illegal conversions’, etc., are communal themes that are indispensable for the Sangh Parivar to whip up anti-Muslim and anti-Christian sentiments to bring their political affiliate, the BJP, to power. The question that arises is, have these sectarian themes of mobilisation become redundant for the Sangh Parivar with the BJP’s rise to power? Are they of no utility to the Parivar now? It seems that this issue has not even been settled within the RSS Parivar as the heated debates about the cause of defeat in the 2004 General Elections within the BJP and between its fraternal organisations indicate.
My answer to these questions is that the importance of such issues cannot diminish for the Sangh Parivar. Non-communal themes of mobilisation even if deployed have a transient status. For instance, the secular theme of development does not have the same perpetual hold as the more communal themes of ‘Hindu society in danger’ and ‘Muslims – an anti-national community’, etc. Development as a mobilisational issue is being used of late but its ranking is secondary and it has a status of transience. The RSS and its frontal organisations have no other sustainable model of mass mobilisation than the use of Hindu-specific themes. The urge to use these themes, in fact, becomes irresistible once they bring political power.
Further, socio-economic issues are not integral to the Sangh Parivar’s ideology. Hindutva is not a plan for socio-economic transformation. It is a view of society that is pledged to building a Hindu rashtra in India by removing the secular, democratic and plural values which formed the core of the freedom struggle and have formed the bedrock of the Indian state since. This is not to say that the Sangh combine does not or cannot talk of social oppression or economic exploitation. At times it does, but these issues do not form the core of its ideology or even the main agenda of its politics. These issues are raised, if at all, mainly as supplements to the Sangh Parivar’s core agenda during elections. In other words, they serve a purely electoral purpose. Therefore, it becomes that much more difficult for them to sustain a long-term campaign on these issues however much they may speak about making ‘development’ their electoral agenda.
The potential of Hindu communal themes for political mobilisation has and will remain intact even when the BJP is in power. Additionally, such issues are needed:
a) to keep the energies of the ground cadre, like the Bajrang Dal and the VHP engaged. The cadre force, which makes for social presence and social force has to be constantly involved to prevent the organisation from becoming loose and dispersed;
b) Hindutva has to be maintained as a live movement lest it vanish from public attention. Its going into oblivion means taking the wind out of the Sangh ideology. Communal issues have to be made live issues because they help in keeping the support base intact and also lead to polarisation along narrow religious lines and bring votes;
c) emotive religio-communal-nationalist campaign themes are needed during elections to counter rival political parties, and such themes have to be made more mobilisationally effective if the opposition is highlighting socio-economic issues, that is, the real issues that affect people or is becoming politically formidable.
Violence Against Religious Minorities as a Strategy of Mobilisation
The violence against the Christians, especially during 1998 and thereafter, has to be seen in this light. The wrath of the VHP and Bajrang Dal against the Christians represent all what I have just discussed above. It was the issue of conversions that became the pretext on which the Christian community was targeted. Conversions by minority religious communities (and this time especially the Christians) was communally interpreted and dubbed as anti-national. The Christians, thus, once again became the victims of Hindu revival under the VHP, much like the 1960s and 1970s when the early VHP was consolidating itself on an anti-Christian agenda. Hence, the Christian conversion question is not a new issue for the VHP, but a new kind of militancy was added to it, a militancy that was more physical than verbal.
The BJP’s electoral victory definitely made an impact on the Sangh affiliates in the sense that there was an obvious upward mood swing, which was manifest in the flurry of sectarian activity and propaganda directed against the minorities. The Christian community was consistently targeted in the late 1990s. The expression of antagonism and distrust against it was marked by low intensity violence with its intentions openly flaunted. The sustained charitable work of the Christian missions among the tribal community within India prompted the ire of the Hindu militant groups and acted as a tool to mobilise the urban middle class.
What was evident that these attacks were as much political as ideological. The central agenda on which the BJP built its election campaign in 1999 was Sonia Gandhi’s Italian-Christian birth. The political nature of the brutal violence on Christians in tribal areas made it evident that it was not merely a Hindu versus Christian issue. The objective of building an opposition to the Congress by a propaganda that it was led by a Christian-outsider and dubbing the Christians as ‘anti-national’ was a handy strategy of containing the Congress’ influence in tribal areas and mobilising the Hindu votes for the BJP. Targeting Sonia Gandhi served a political purpose. She was targeted more as a Christian ‘outsider’ than a Congress party leader.
The Christians were accused of starting the destructive sprees and also for torching their own places of worship to help Gandhi and her Congress. This attitude of disowning an involvement in the violence on the part of the Hindu Jagran Manch, VHP and the Bajrang Dal was peculiar. The main reason for this denial seems to be doubts about popular support on the issue. It looks that unlike the Rama temple issue, where the VHP went forth with the assumption of popular support, it did not seem sure of concrete mass support on the Christian conversion issue. It was not sure regarding the direction public opinion would take on the matter. While the Christian conversion issue was important for the VHP to keep the energies of its ranks occupied, and Sonia’s entry into politics provided it with an opportunity to direct its energies against the Christians, it also had to tread cautiously to gauge popular opinion. The missionary contribution to education in modern India especially of the middle classes and also recognition of its services towards the destitute made this uncertainty and doubt about public opinion very real. In case of an adverse response the Sangh Parivar affiliates had to make sure that they did not to alienate the middle class support bases, especially at a time of political consolidation by their sibling, the BJP.
Also, the BJP’s being in power at the centre meant that it should not face embarrassment[6] on the minority question with its coalition partners and the Parliament which would jeopardise its career as a ruling party heading a coalition government. The common governance agenda of this coalition also restricted the BJP’s open association with overt minority bashers. Moreover, the focus of international media on India on account of the anti-Christian violence and the Pope’s visit to India in 1999 further made the VHP and Bajrang Dal leadership refute any suggestions of their involvement in the violence against the Christian community. Again, embarrassing the BJP before the international community and world opinion had to be avoided, especially in an era of economic reforms towards liberalisation.
In any case, it is interesting that the denial of involvement in anti-Christian violence went along with militant utterances and certain dictats to the minority communities. These were accompanied by statements, which attributed demonic and fanatical traits to the minority communities and went on to assert that it is these traits in the Christian and Muslim communities that beget a violent response from the VHP. This use of weapons, however, is always stated to be in self-defence or defence of the Hindu dharma. These statements were accompanied by serious allegations that Christians are engaged in ‘an international conspiracy to divide India’, they nurture ‘anti-national sentiments’ and ‘encourage separatism’.[7]
Blaming the victimised Christians of burning their own churches and assaulting the Christian nuns and missionaries seems absurd, but it does strengthen the common impression that the already aggrieved and threatened Hindu community is further endangered due to the actions of minority religious communities especially when such communities are ‘anti-national’ and ‘separatists’ – allegations which are loaded with serious implications in the context of strained Indo-Pakistan relations. It is not without implications that the RSS and its affiliates are parading themselves as defenders of national security where this ‘national security’ in both their words and actions acquires a Muslim/Christian versus Hindu interpretation – the anti-national/anti-Hindu element versus the innocent Hindu victim, respectively. The RSS commemorating the completion of 75 years held a camp in October 2000 with the aim of conveying its claim that it is a mass organisation of the Hindus, and interestingly the camp was called Rashtriya Raksha Mahashivir. A few months before, the Bajrang Dal was described by the VHP as ‘synonoymous with security’ and as an organisation which is terror for anti-Hindus.[8]
It is noteworthy that the attacks on minorities are not so much attacks on individuals as on the identity of minorities as distinct communities. The target of anti-minority violence might be a Christian missionary or a tribal or a Muslim maulvi or a poor Muslim slum dweller, but what needs to be emphasised is that through all these assaults it is the minority community, which forms the target of the Sangh Parivar.[9] In fact, one can go a step further and say that it is the existence of minority communities as distinct entities forming an integral part of India what the Sangh Parivar is averse to. A Christian or a Muslim who professes his faith as a community member having political rights of an Indian citizen is what the Sangh Parivar cannot stand. And a misconception that minority communities are monolithic political entities adds to this aversion. In other words, pluralism does not fit into the worldview of the Sangh Parivar. In Ashok Singhal’s words, ‘Islam has a future in this country only if it completely submerges itself among the hundreds of sects that already exist in India’.[10] And again, ‘The interpretation of the Quran in this country must be set right. It (the Quran) should be adapted according to the great traditions of India’.[11] These statements make it clear that giving up the community identity is the demand, which the Parivar makes of the minority communities.
The Godhra incident changed the political currents in Gujarat. The incident along with the subsequent anti-Muslim violence at the hands of the Sangh Parivar members and sympathisers brought the BJP back to power in the assembly elections in December 2002. The party based its electoral mobilisation on a public stance, which made Hindutva synonymous with security, and terrorism as another name for the Muslim community. Under the banner of national security, the Sangh Parivar affiliates campaigned for the BJP in Gujarat.
This political mobilisation was preceded by a carnage which some say can only be compared to the post-partition riots in their brutality and suffering. The difference is that this time it was the Muslims who were ruthlessly targeted in what can be compared to genocide. Hindutva (and violence for Hindutva) played an influential role in the elections and helped the BJP win an overwhelming majority at a time when local issues of development and rehabilitation (of earthquake and riot victims) had made the balance tilt heavily against it. In the year 2000, the BJP had lost major support in the local body elections. It had won only 27 per cent of the zilla panchayat seats compared to 82 per cent it had won in 1995. Most importantly, it had lost the Ahmedabad and Rajkot municipal elections and had suffered a few bye-election defeats.
The Sangh affiliates put their energies behind an aggressive communal campaign and both in statement and word publicised the Godhra train burning, the attack on Parliament and Akshardham as instances of Muslim ‘terrorism’. The BJP in Gujarat led by chief minister, Narendra Modi, focused on the heavily communalised theme of ‘security’ which they put before ‘development’. The word that went around was that only when security is ensured can there be development.
The 2002 Gujarat assembly election results[12] display that the BJP did gain much through the pogrom in Gujarat. The BJP’s vote share rose from 44.81 per cent in 1998 to 51 per cent in these elections. In places of worst rioting – Panchmahals (which includes Godhra), Dohad, Vadodara districts of central Gujarat – the BJP won all the seats. It won 42 out of 50 seats in Central Gujarat the worst violence affected area, a big leap forward considering the fact that it had won just 15 seats here in 1998. In 1998, it was the Congress and its ally the RJP who formed the dominant force in Central Gujarat. In the total 19 seats of Ahmedabad, where the Muslims were hunted unsparingly, the BJP stood victorious in 17 and the Congress ended up with 2. In 65 riot-affected constituencies the BJP won 52 seats and the Congress 13. In the 116 unaffected constituencies also the BJP performed better than the Congress and won 74 seats while the Congress won 38 and others 4. However, in the riot-torn constituencies the BJP’s vote share was higher than in the unaffected constituencies. It was 56.4 per cent in the 52 seats it won in the riot-affected constituencies and 45.6 per cent in the 74 seats it won in the unaffected ones, which indicates the gains it reaped through the communalisation of the electorate. The Congress vote share on the other hand was 37.6 and 40.4 in the affected and the unaffected ones, respectively.
Gujarat has witnessed some intense caste and communal violence since 1969, but ‘it was not until the 1980s that frequently violent political assertion of the upper castes and classes became routine in Gujarati politics’ (Desai 2002). The success of the KHAM (Kshatriya, Harijan, Adivasi and Muslim) alliance has much to do with it. The KHAM electoral formula of the Congress in 1980 threatened ‘the higher caste guardians of the dominant culture’ who then ‘found in the Hindutva-based Gujarati culture an effective and acceptable alternative’ (Parekh 2002: 29). The Hindutva ideology provided the upper caste entrepreneurial/middle classes a ‘sanction to pursue their own agenda of greater political, economic and social control’ (Yagnik 2002: 21). It hardly raised ‘any ethical questions for its supporters’ (Yagnik 2002: 21). Thus, the attack, allegedly by Muslims, on Hindutva activists at Godhra generated such intense anger among these classes that brutal violence on the Muslims was openly supported and justified. Also, the Dalit and Adivasi participation in this violence was something unprecedented, the reasons for which can be found in economic hardship and the need for social recognition. The ground work by the VHP since 1980s among the Dalit and Adivasi communities of Gujarat also explains their involvement in the anti-Muslim attacks in 2002.
The startling recovery of the Congress in the 2004 General Elections in Gujarat are further proof that for the BJP and its fraternal organisations, ‘development’ and economic issues can never become a substitute for the mobilisational strength of Hindutva issues.
Conclusion
Contrasting 2004 with the Gujarat elections of December 2002, where the BJP trounced the Congress in the backdrop of the February – March, 2002 massacres, foregrounds the Sangh Parivar’s successful strategies of mobilisation. These strategies are contingent upon an internally cohesive Hindu community reacting in fear and hatred against anti-national ‘outsiders’ who are portrayed as threatening the very existence of the Hindus. This mass psychology is itself based on a communal interpretation of history and the use of religious themes and symbols as social markers which create a homogenised Hindu community where caste hierarchy is left intact but glossed over.
Anti-minority violence, both verbal and physical, is an inseparable part of Hindutva’s mobilisational strategies. Attempts are made to generate hatred between the Hindus and the minority religious communities depicting the latter as foreigners with a false claim to Indian citizenship. This violence goes hand in hand with the villianisation of minorities portrayed as fanatics, intolerant, anti-national and terrorists.
What is most worrisome is the steady acceptance of Hindutva among marginalised communities like the Dalits and Adivasis, as well as its growth in popularity among other oppressed sections like women and the urban working classes. The mobilisation of large sections among these demographic groups for Hindutva is a trend which needs greater study and immediate action.
References
· Andersen, Walter K. and Damle, Sridhar D. 1987. Brotherhood in Saffron: The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Hindu Revivalism. Boulder: Westview Press.
· Basu, Tapan et al. 1993. Khaki Shorts and Saffron Flags. Hyderabad: Orient Longman.
· Desai, Radhika. 2002. Blazing Gujarat: The Image of India’s Future (A shorter version appeared in The Hindu, 6 March 2002).
· Goyal, D.R. 1979. Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh. New Delhi: Radha Krishna Prakashan.
· Graham, Bruce. 1993. Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics: The Origins and Development of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
· Kapur, Anuradha. 1992. Militant Images of a Tranquil God. In Politics of Confrontation: The Babri Masjid Ramjanmabhoomi Controversy Runs-Riot, ed. Asghar Ali Engineer. New Delhi: Ajanta Publications.
· —-. 1993. Deity to Crusader: The Changing Iconography of Ram. In Hindus and Others: The Question of Identity in India Today, ed. Gyanendra Pandey. New Delhi: Viking.
· Katju, Manjari. 2003. Vishva Hindu Parishad and Indian Politics. Hyderabad: Orient Longman.
· Panikkar, K.N., ed. 1991. Communalism in India: History, Politics and Culture. New Delhi: Manohar.
· Parekh, Bhikhu. 2002. Making Sense of Gujarat. Seminar. No. 513. May.
· Thapar, Romila. 1991. Communalism and the Historical Legacy: Some Facets. In Communalism in India: History, Politics and Culture, ed. K.N. Panikkar. New Delhi: Manohar.
· Vyas, H.K. 1983. Vishva Hindu Parishad: The RSS Broad Outfit for Spreading Militant Aggressive Hindu Communal Poison. New Delhi: Communist Party of India Publication.
· Yagnik, Achyut. 2002. The Pathology of Gujarat. Seminar. No. 513. May.
[1] For a detailed account of the RSS see Goyal (1979) and Andersen et al (1987).
[2] For a thorough analysis see K.N.Panikkar (1991)and Romila Thapar (1991).
[3] For details on this agitation see Bruce Graham (1993).
[4] For more details see Manjari Katju (2003).
[5] Kailash Chandra Kotiya, Ram shila se Ram mandir tak (From Rama’s brick to Rama’s temple), Hindu Vishva, January 1990, p.7. This article was first published on 5 November 1989 in Rajasthan Patrika.
[6] An emotion it let go by the time Gujarat happened.
[7] Bhavdeep Kang, ‘Method in Madness’, Outlook, 18 January 1999, p. 25.
[8] Rajesh Joshi, ‘Look Delhi, Aim Rome’, Outlook, 10 July 2000, p. 25.
[9] I am indebted to Professor Javeed Alam for this insight.
[10] Rajesh Joshi, Interview with Ashok Singhal, Outlook, 22 February 1999, p. 16.
[11] Ibid., p. 17.
[12] Election Data Sources: India Today, 30 December 2002 and Frontline, 3 January 2003.
